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MANAGING “RETREAT”: THE CHALLENGES OF ADAPTING LAND
USE TO CLIMATE CHANGE
Andrea McArdle*
I. INTRODUCTION
Coastal cities of all sizes and levels of development face mounting
governance challenges1 in response to climate science’s projections2 of
continued ocean warming and sea-level rise.3 These challenges implicate a
burgeoning set of responsibilities for protecting public health and safety,
including food security, environmental quality, biodiversity, effective
stewardship over the integrity of the built environment and infrastructure,
and maintaining local economic well-being. Addressing these
*

Andrea McArdle is Professor of Law at City University of New York School of Law, holds
law degrees and a Ph.D. in American Studies, and teaches and writes on urban land use
through an equity lens, including the environmental and socioeconomic challenges faced by
urban communities confronted with climate risk, and urban policy makers’ approach to
resilience strategies.
1. At the 2015 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, UN Member States
recognized the role of local governments as stakeholders for participating in strategies to
reduce the risk of natural and human-made disaster. Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk
Reduction 2015–2030, U.N. OFF. FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION (2015), http://www.unisdr
.org/we/inform /publications/43291.
2. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s 2014 Synthesis Report, based on
the reports of the Panel’s three Working Groups, including relevant Special Reports, as the
final part of the Panel’s Fifth Assessment Report, underscores the risks in its Summary for
Policymakers.
SPM 2.3 Future risks and impacts caused by a changing climate:

Climate change will amplify existing risks and create new risks for
natural and human systems. Risks are unevenly distributed and are
generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities in countries
at all levels of development.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS
REPORT 13 (The Core Writing Team, Rajendra K. Pachauri & Leo Meyer eds., 2014),
http://ar5-syr.ipcc.ch/ipcc/ipcc/resources/pdf/IPCC_SynthesisReport.pdf [hereinafter SPM
2.3].
3. In one of the more urgent predictions concerning sea-level rise, the melting of ice on
Antarctica alone could cause seas to rise more than 15 meters (49 feet) by 2500 if ongoing
levels of greenhouse gas emissions persist. Brady Dennis & Chris Mooney, Scientists Nearly
Double Sea Level Rise Projections for 2100, Because of Antarctica, WASH. POST (Mar. 30,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/03/30/antarcticloss-could-double-expected-sea-level-rise-by-2100-scientists-say/?utm_term=.044481386d88
(discussing Robert M. DeConto & David Pollard, Contribution of Antarctica to Past and
Future Sea-Level Rise, 531 NATURE INT’L. J. OF SCI. 591 (2016)).
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responsibilities, in turn, implicates cities’ legal authority, political
capacity—including the capacity and will to build acceptance of local
governance responses—and ability to leverage funding for weather disaster
reduction. This article adopts as a working definition of climate governance
the range of policy-setting mechanisms by which cities engage these
challenges and responsibilities, including legislation, executive action,
participating in litigation, and involvement in multisectoral and transnational
networks.
In the face of elevated urban climate risks, the concept of resilience has
gained considerable ground as both a governance response and an
increasingly pervasive discourse. With its definitional and conceptual
breadth, resilience offers cities a range of tools for adapting to climaterelated risks. To date, most cities have emphasized coastal and building-andinfrastructural resilience as climate governance strategies. They have not
embraced land-use alternatives, collectively referred to as “managed
retreat,” that discourage, limit, or seek to reverse development of areas that
are vulnerable to coastal inundation, and that opt for natural reuses of land,
based on the costs and risks associated with rebuilding. Given the
projections of increased and new risks posed by climate change,4 this article
considers the role that managed retreat might have in climate governance
policies.
Recognizing the potentially substantial costs and practical barriers to
implementing many aspects of managed retreat, especially in densely
populated urban floodplains, the article argues that retreat options
nonetheless should be included in the calculus of adaptive strategies that
coastal cities consider. Public health, safety, environmental, equity, and
economic concerns make retreat a highly salient consideration for any
locality’s climate governance policy. The extent to which it is feasible for a
locality to apply managed retreat strategies, even in part, as a component of
climate resilience will depend on the local context, economy, population,
built environment, and infrastructure, including the extent to which retreat
would entail, on the one hand, curtailing development on currently
undeveloped, vulnerable areas or, on the other, condemning or buying out
presently occupied properties.
To develop this analysis, Part II identifies key attributes of the
discourse and practice of climate resilience, noting three central modalities
of resilient climate governance: coastal resilience, resilient rebuilding, and
managed retreat. Part III considers the approaches taken to climate
governance by three coastal cities with recognized vulnerability to coastal
inundation as suggestive of a general preference for coastal and structuraland infrastructural-resilience strategies over managed retreat.
4. SPM 2.3, supra note 2.
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Part IV addresses cities’ contrastingly infrequent resort to managed
retreat and considers in greater depth the implications of using managed
retreat as a climate governance response. This section examines data
detailing characteristics of housing and the demographic make-up of
residents of the U.S. coastal areas that would be directly affected by
implementing a retreat policy. Further, it considers factors that complicate
the adoption of retreat as a strategy, including an ideology of urban growth
and economic, logistical, and other practical obstacles to pursuing retreat as
a form of climate governance.
Drawing on the analysis in Part IV, Part V considers New York’s
limited application of retreat principles following the effects of Superstorm
Sandy, a destructive and costly tropical cyclone that struck the northeastern
U.S. in 2012.5 Examining New York’s experience in light of the factors that
favor rebuilding and militate against an easy embrace of managed retreat,
this section raises concern about the city’s ongoing up-zoning and planned
development in floodplain areas. The article concludes with an inventory of
considerations relevant to potential use of managed retreat by localities at
any scale as part of the calculus for developing sound, responsible, and
environmentally equitable climate governance responses.
II. CLIMATE GOVERNANCE: MODALITIES OF CLIMATE RESILIENCE
A.

Resilience as a Governance Discourse

The definitional and conceptual breadth of resilience has enabled it to
operate across disciplines and discursive traditions as a “boundary object”6
and ”pervasive idiom.”7 It appears in the literature of a range of disciplines,
including engineering, psychology, ecology, social systems, and disaster
recovery.8 In an urban planning context, ideas associated with resilience
have contributed to a comprehensive definition focusing on urban resilience
as a methodology:

5. The National Hurricane Center of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration ranks Sandy as the fourth costliest mainland U.S. tropical cyclone. Costliest
U.S. Tropical Cyclones Tables Updated, NAT’L HURRICANE CTR. (Jan. 26, 2018),
https://www. nhc.noaa.gov/news/UpdatedCostliest.pdf.
6. Sara Meerow, Joshua P. Newell & Melissa Stults, Defining Urban Resilience: A
Review, 147 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 38, at 39, 46; Kathleen Tierney, Resilience and the
Neoliberal Project: Discourses, Critiques, Practices—And Katrina, 59 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 1, at
5–6 (2015), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1024.3276&rep=rep1
&type=pdf.
7. Tierney, supra note 6, at 5.
8. Patrick Martin-Breen & J. Marty Anderies, Resilience: A Literature Review,
BELLAGIO INITIATIVE (2011), https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/123456789/3692.
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[T]he ability of an urban system—and all of its constituent socioecological and socio-technical networks across temporal and spatial
scales—to maintain or rapidly return to desired functions in the face of a
disturbance, to adapt to change, and to quickly transform systems that
limit current or future adaptive capacity. 9

In the broader disaster-response literature, resilience has also been
conceptualized as a process, in the sense of learning and improving
decision-making to better respond to risks.10
The conceptual underpinnings of resilience have been central to the
policy and technocratic discussions in the burgeoning field of climate
governance. In the climate context, the Rockefeller Foundation has
supported a range of initiatives to increase the capacity of localities to adapt
to coastal risks.11 Reflecting that orientation toward efficacious response to
climate disturbance, the Foundation defines resilience as the “capacity of an
individual, community, or institution to dynamically and effectively respond
to shifting climate impact circumstances while continuing to function at an
acceptable level.” 12
Attributes associated with resilient city governance include systems
that are reflective, robust, redundant, flexible, resourceful, inclusive, and
integrated.13 Although, as a managerial practice, resilience can operate nonideologically, the breadth and flexibility of resilience as a concept also have
rhetorical and political dimensions. The orientation of resilience toward
positive functioning and outcomes has led to a tendency in climate
governance discourse to lapse into colloquial and political usage of the term

9. Meerow et al., supra note 6, at 45.
10. Susan Cutter et al., A Place-based Model for Understanding Community Resilience
to Natural Disasters, 18 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 598, 600 (2008).
11. See, e.g., 100 RESILIENT CITIES, http://www.100resilientcities.org/about-us/ (last
visited Aug. 31, 2018) (providing financial, logistical, and expert support for a network of
selected cities to pursue resilience strategies that will address “not just the shocks—
earthquakes, fires, floods, etc.—but also the stresses that weaken the fabric of a city on a day
to day or cyclical basis”); Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network, ROCKEFELLER
FOUNDATION, https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/our-work/initiatives/asian-cities-climate
-change-resilience-network/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2018) (capacity building to assist cities in
six Asian countries develop climate resilience strategies).
12. ROCKEFELLER FOUND., Building Climate Change Resilience 1 (Aug. 4, 2009),
https://www.acccrn.net/sites/default/files/publication/attach/10_RF_WhitePaper_Resilience.p
df.
13. Brett Branco & John R. Waldman, Resilience Practice in Urban Watersheds, in
PROSPECTS FOR RESILIENCE: INSIGHTS FROM NEW YORK CITY’S JAMAICA BAY 21, 28 (Eric W.
Sanderson et al., eds., 2016) (discussing urban resilience formulation developed by ARUP, an
independent group of designers, planners, and engineers, “working across every aspect of
today’s built environment”).
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and to conflate it with more precise disciplinary meanings,14 a practice
evident in New York City’s use of resilience as a signifier for “toughness.”15
Some commentators have noted that resilience narratives can fit comfortably
within neoliberal political and economic arrangements, emphasizing growth
and privatization or public-private partnerships.16 In this view, resilience as a
governance strategy contemplates a strong role for the private development
sector in post-disaster campaigns.17
B.

Strategies of Climate Resilience

In the context of urban climate governance, the principal resilient
strategies comprise coastal protection, including hard18 and soft19 armoring;
rebuilding structures to revised standards thought to withstand predicted
effects of climate change; and managed retreat, that is, various land- use
controls and legal mechanisms that limit or adapt development of coastal
land in light of its vulnerability to sea-level rise and storm surges.20 Retreat
options encompass a range of land-use adaptations, including limits on
rebuilding, acquiring coastal land to prevent further development, resettling
residential populations further inland away from flood-prone areas,
14. Fiona Miller et al., Resilience and Vulnerability: Complementary or Conflicting
Concepts?, 15 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 3 (2010), http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss3
/art11/.
15. PLANYC, A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK 6 (2013), http://s-media.nyc.
gov/agencies/sirr/SIRR_singles_Lo_res.pdf [hereinafter A Stronger, More Resilient New
York].
16. Tierney, supra note 6, at 6–9.
17. Id. at 11–13.
18. Hard armoring generally is the use of physical structures such as seawalls,
breakwaters, and riprap to hold back the flow of sea water and prevent erosion of shoreline
sediment. What is shoreline armoring? NAT’L OCEAN SERV., https://oceanservice.noaa.gov
/facts/ shoreline-armoring.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2018). See also Megan M. Herzog &
Sean B. Hecht, Combatting Sea-Level Rise in Southern California: How Local Governments
Can Seize Adaptation Opportunities While Minimizing Legal Risk, 19 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 463, 492–97 (2013) (discussing methods of hard and soft shoreline
armoring).
19. Soft armoring refers to nature-based buffering against flooding, such as restoring
coastal wetlands or creating living shorelines. Executive Summary of Soft Armoring and the
Corps: The Impact of Army Corps of Engineers Permitting On State Coastal Protection
Policies, GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CTR. (Dec. 2011), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/07/GCC_ACOEpermittingES_12-11_Finalv2.pdf. Living shorelines
are stabilization methods that establish or preserve species habitats and ecosystem benefits.
Living Shorelines, VA. INST. MARINE SCI., CTR. FOR COASTAL RESOURCES MGMT.,
http://www.vims.edu/ccrm/outreach/living_shorelines/index.php (last visited Oct 13, 2018).
20. See generally ANNE SIDERS, MANAGED COASTAL RETREAT: A LEGAL HANDBOOK ON
SHIFTING DEVELOPMENT AWAY FROM VULNERABLE AREAS, COLUM. LAW SCH. CTR. FOR
CLIMATE CHANGE (Oct. 2013), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/
climate-change/files/Publications/Fellows/ManagedCoastalRetreat_FINAL_Oct%2030.pdf.
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discontinuing at-risk business and institutional uses, and developing naturebased reuses of coastal land, such as wetlands restoration and cultivating
parkland, that can serve as natural buffers to the effects of storm surges.21
This suite of resilience strategies varies along a number of axes, such
as whether they entail rebuilding or restrictions on development, whether
they employ nature-based or human-made shoreline protections, and
whether limitations on development apply prospectively or restrict
continued use or redevelopment of currently occupied properties, which
includes the possibility of relocating residents or businesses. Coastal cities
choose climate governance approaches that reflect local geography, political
economy, ideology, and political will, and thus the potential for variation is
considerable, even among localities that are the most vulnerable to coastal
inundation. Part III considers the approaches taken to climate governance by
three coastal cities as suggestive of a general preference for structural- and
infrastructural-resilience strategies within an overall orientation toward
redeveloping and protecting the waterfront.
III. CLIMATE RESILIENCE STRATEGIES APPLIED: THREE FLOODVULNERABLE CITIES
The climate governance choices of flood-vulnerable cities necessarily
will reflect local context, history, geography, ecology, economy, and
cultural orientation toward risk, against the backdrop of requirements or
guidelines included in state coastal development programs under the
auspices of the federal Coastal Zone Management Act.22 Nonetheless, the
adaptive approaches taken by the three illustrative cities discussed in this
section—New Orleans, New York, and Rotterdam in the Netherlands—
suggest shared preferences for hard armored protections of the waterfront
and rebuilding waterfront structures over managed retreat options.
A.

New Orleans: Rebuilding and Protecting Against Coastal Inundation

In August 2005, the ravages of Hurricane Katrina, ranked by the
National Hurricane Center as the costliest tropical storm at $125 billion in
damages,23 breached levees that inundated large portions of New Orleans’
low-lying land and led to the evacuation of more than one-half of the city’s

21. Id.
22. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq.; Act of Oct. 27,
1972, 86 Stat. 1280 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq.) (1972); See generally
SIDERS, supra note 20, at 21–35.
23. Hurricane Katrina is statistically tied with Hurricane Harvey as the costliest tropical
storm in terms of total monetary damage. NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., supra note 5.
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residents.24 In the storm’s aftermath, a policy storm raged within the city
regarding whether the most vulnerable parts of the city should be rebuilt at
all.25 The ambivalent acceptance of the idea that New Orleans residents had
the “right to return” to New Orleans26 resolved the policy debate in favor of
rebuilding and fortifying the city to withstand at least a 100-year storm.27 As
a consequence, the city’s post-Katrina expenditures, mainly provided by
federal or state funds, were dedicated to housing programs—with their own
checkered history28—and the construction of an elaborate system of levees,
walls, and pumps.29
Federally financed through Community Development Block GrantDisaster Recovery funds and administered by state government, the
Louisiana Road Home program distributed $9 billion in grants to support
rebuilding more than 70% of housing units damaged by Hurricane Katrina.30
Using three tiers of cash grants as incentives, the program promoted
rebuilding in heavily inundated neighborhoods.31

24. Allison Plyer, Facts for Features: Katrina Impact, DATA CTR. (Aug. 26, 2016),
https://www.datacenterresearch.org/data-resources/katrina/facts-for-impact/.
25. See, e.g., Darryl Lorenzo Wellington, New Orleans: A Right to Return? 53 DISSENT
23, 32–34; Ray Taras, After the Storm: Pathologies of Decision Making in New Orleans,
POL’Y OPTIONS (Dec. 1, 2005), http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/global-warming-aperfect-storm/after-the-storm-pathologies-of-decision-making-in-new-orleans/.
26. See, e.g., Lolita B. Inniss, A Domestic Right of Return?: Race, Rights, and Residency
in New Orleans in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 325
(2007), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/twlj/vol27/iss2/2 (noting the financial, logistical,
and programmatic impediments placed in the way of black New Orleans residents’ return to
their homes after Katrina).
27. See Amy Liu, BUILDING A BETTER NEW ORLEANS: A REVIEW OF AND PLAN FOR
PROGRESS ONE YEAR AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA, BROOKINGS INST. (2006), https://www.
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/200608_katrinareview.pdf.
28. Kevin Fox Gotham, Reinforcing Inequalities: The Impact of the CDBG Program on
Post-Katrina Rebuilding, 24:1 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 192, 199–205 (2014), http://dx.
doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2013.840666.
29. John Schwartz, How to Save a Sinking Coast? Katrina Created a Laboratory, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/08/science/louisiana-10-yearsafter-hurricane-katrina.html.
30. JESSE GREGORY, THE IMPACT OF POST-KATRINA REBUILDING GRANTS ON THE
RESETTLEMENT CHOICES OF NEW ORLEANS HOMEOWNERS 5–6 (June 2017) (unpublished
working paper), https://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~jmgregory/Gregory_katrina_dissertation2.pdf.
31. Although the grant amounts were capped, higher awards were given to residents who
pledged either to rebuild a damaged home or build a new home in Louisiana within the threeyear window provided by the program according to the following guidelines:

(1) Grant to residential property owners to rebuild within three years;
grant limited to difference between amount of damages and insurance
proceeds received (up to $150,000);
(2) Grant in the same amount to finance building a new home within
three years in Louisiana in exchange for turning over the current
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Supplementing the program for homeowners, and reflecting the large
number of rental properties that were damaged, the Small Rental Property
Program paid 4,500 landlords $435 million to build affordable units for lowto moderate-income families.32 The program led to the demolition of four
public housing projects, which were replaced with mixed-income housing
and a voucher system.33
The rebuilding programs were open to the criticism that they
essentially placed returning New Orleans residents in low-lying
neighborhoods in the direct path of future severe flooding. However, $14.5
billion was expended to construct 350 miles of levees, pumps, and gates
around the city to withstand a 100-year storm.34 Further, state-led efforts
under the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority35 were launched as
part of a master planning process that included restoring wetlands and
building up barrier islands in part with “diversions” of silt and freshwater to
nourish and raise up land.36
property to the Louisiana Land Trust, which gave the properties to local
redevelopment agencies;
(3) Similar to (2) but 40% smaller grant to reflect absence of rebuilding
or location requirements.
Id.
32. David Hammer, Examining Post-Katrina Road Home Program: ‘It’s more than the
money. It’s the hoops we had to jump through to do it,’ THE ADVOCATE (Aug. 23, 2015, 4:51
AM),
http://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_f9763ca5-42ba-5a62-9935c5f7ca94a7c4.html.
33. For discussion of a report on the policy and its impact, see Dani McClain, Former
Residents of New Orleans’s Demolished Housing Projects Tell Their Stories, THE NATION
(Aug. 28, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/former-residents-of-new-orleansdemolished-housing-projects-tell-their-stories/.
34. Miguel Llanos, Will New Orleans’ $14.5 Billion Walls Stand Up to the Next Big
Storm?, NBC NEWS (Aug. 26 2015, 8:37 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/
hurricane-katrina-anniversary/new-orleans-14-5-billion-walls-n415816.
35. The Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority’s 2017 Master Plan, projecting
$50 billion in coastal projects, includes the largest national investment in marsh creation from
dredged material and sediment diversion, which are expected to build up land that has been
disappearing along the coast as a result of erosion and subsidence, exacerbated by oil drilling
and other economic activities, and sea-level rise. Kevin Sack & John Schwartz, Left to
Louisiana’s Tides, A Village Fights for Time, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2018),
https://www.nytimes
.com/interactive/2018/02/24/us/100000005761606.app.html?emc=edit_ta_20180224&nl=top
-stories&nlid=27366739&ref=cta.
36. “The 2017 Coastal Master Plan includes 79 restoration, 13 structural protection, and
32 nonstructural risk reduction projects. . . .” The plan defines restoration projects as those
that “build or maintain land and support productive habitat for commercially and
recreationally important activities coast wide.” Structural protection projects serve as
physical barriers against storm surge. Nonstructural risk reduction projects comprise other
resilience strategies, such as raising and flood-proofing buildings and providing support for
property owners. Here the plan mentions the possibility of relocating out of areas at high risk
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Although the prospect was broached that New Orleans would adopt a
policy of reduced development to avoid subjecting residents and businesses
to repeat exposure to flooding,37 the discourse of “return,” opportunism
driven by privatization and gentrification goals,38 and the availability of
federal funding to finance rebuilding secured the opposite outcome.
B.

New York City: A Rebuilding Imperative

Superstorm Sandy, an intense tropical storm39 that struck the Caribbean
and northeastern United States in late October 2012, accompanied by “major
to record” storm surges in the New York metropolitan area and parts of New
England, had a notable impact on New York City. The storm affected all
major sectors, including health care, transportation, and communications;40
the financial district and other institutional and residential structures in the
southern half of Manhattan were immobilized and without electricity for
five days.41 The storm also inflicted severe damage to residential properties,
from high-rise buildings to beachfront bungalows throughout the city’s
coastal areas. The storm heavily damaged the city’s waterfront structures
and infrastructure, including boardwalks, landings, and terminals, and
caused substantial beach erosion, with a loss of three million cubic yards of
sand across the city.42
The city’s principal policy blueprint in the aftermath of Sandy, A
Stronger, More Resilient New York,43 proposed more than 250 broadly
formulated initiatives to strengthen coastal resilience and building-structural
resilience.44 The city vowed to reinforce its 520 miles of waterfront and
adjust zoning and building code requirements to ensure that new buildings
and substantial improvements would meet Federal Emergency Management
for flooding. COASTAL PROTECTION & RESTORATION AUTHORITY OF LA., LOUISIANA’S
COMPREHENSIVE MASTER PLAN FOR A SUSTAINABLE COAST ES-15 (2017),
http://coastal.la.gov/wp-content/uploads
/2017/04/2017-Coastal-Master-Plan_Web-SinglePage_CFinal-with-Effective-Date-06092017.pdf.
37. The Times-Picayune Staff, Plan Shrinks City Footprint, NOLA, http://www.nola.
com/politics/index.ssf/2005/12/plan_shrinks_city_footprint.html (last updated Aug. 13, 2010)
(describing recommendation of Urban Land Institute to impose a temporary moratorium on
building in neighborhoods especially vulnerable to flooding and returning flood-threatened
areas to wetlands).
38. See Wellington, supra note 25, at 27, 32.
39. Sandy was considered to be post-tropical just prior to landfall. Hurricane Sandy,
NAT’L WEATHER SERV., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://www.weather.gov
/okx/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
40. A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK PLANYC, supra note 15, at 14–17.
41. Id. at 15.
42. Id. at 14.
43. Id. at 1.
44. Id. at 416–434.
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Agency (FEMA) standards.45 The city also prioritized repairing and
elevating structurally vulnerable residential structures damaged during
Sandy through Build It Back,46 a costly and delay-ridden program whose
costs have allegedly far outstripped the market value of many of the
properties undergoing rehabilitation.47
Contemplating that coastal residential, business, and institutional uses
would be rebuilt,48 the city explicitly rejected any suggestions “to wall the
city in, or to retreat from the shore.”49 Instead, the report included a
Comprehensive Coastal Protection Plan,50 proposing an array of initiatives
to protect the rebuilt coastline: hard armoring to raise coastal edge
elevations;51 soft shoreline armoring to reduce upland wave zones;52 and
protecting against storm surge through integrated flood protections systems,
floodwalls/levees, local storm surge barriers, and a multipurpose levee.53 In
conjunction with the Rebuild By Design competition,54 which promotes
resilient designs to mitigate the effects of sea-level rise and surges, the city
is also helping to finance a project, dubbed “the BIG U,” comprising 10
miles of protective berms and “deployable walls” along lower (the southern
half) Manhattan, where low lying waterfront areas are particularly

45. Id. at 50–52, 72–73, 78–79 (elevating foundations and critical systems, and raising
living spaces above Design Flood Elevation level).
46. Welcome
to
NYC
Housing
Recovery,
NYC
RECOVERY,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/recovery/html/home/home.shtml (last visited Aug. 9, 2018).
47. Bobby Cuza, In Response to NY1 Special, de Blasio Acknowledges Failures of Build
It Back Program, NY1 (June 19, 2017, 10:30 PM), http://www.ny1.com/nyc/allboroughs/build-it-broke/2017/06/19/in-response-to-ny1-special-de-blasio-acknowledgesfailures-of-build-it-back-program. See also Amanda Farinacci, Complaint Alleges Build It
Back Wasted Millions of Dollars, NY1 (June 12, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://www.ny1.com/
nyc/all-boroughs/news/2017/06/11/allegations-build-it-back-wasted-millions-of-dollars.html.
48. Thus, the report proposed retrofitting existing nursing homes and adult care facilities
in the 100-year floodplain and existing hospitals in the 500-year floodplain. A STRONGER,
MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK, supra note 15, at 153–54.
49. Id. at 7.
50. Id. at 50–66.
51. Id. at 50, 53, 58, 61 (beach nourishment, revetments, bulkheads, and tidal
gates/drainage devices).
52. Id. at 53–54, 61–62 (dunes, offshore breakwaters, wetlands, living shorelines, reefs,
and groins.)
53. Id. at 54–56, 63–64.
54. A collaborative, multi-sector venture dedicated to achieving resilience, the project
originated as a design competition under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development to respond to the effects of Superstorm Sandy in northeastern U.S.
coastal areas. Who We Are, REBUILD BY DESIGN, http://www.rebuildbydesign.org/about (last
visited July 31, 2018).
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vulnerable to surges.55 To date, many of these initiatives have been plagued
by delays.56
Since 2016, the city has committed to a series of up-zoning
initiatives,—undertaken in part to increase the city’s stock of below-marketrate housing57—in which at least half of the areas to be rezoned are in 100year flood zones or are likely to be remapped into those zones.58 In 2017,
however, the City Council created Special Coastal Risk Districts in the East
Shore section of the borough of Staten Island59 and in at-risk beachfront
communities in the borough of Queens near Jamaica Bay. 60 These measures
will restrict density in areas acknowledged to be at particular risk for coastal
flooding, and will be discussed in Part V.61
Reflecting a development imperative that generally has been
understood to benefit an urban economy and tax base,62 A Stronger, More
Resilient New York and more recent initiatives have adopted an overall
55. Leanna Garfield, Manhattan Plans to Build a Massive $1 Billion Wall and Park to
Guard Against the Next Inevitable Superstorm, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 27, 2018, 9:28 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/new-york-city-flooding-manhattan-coastal-barriers-2018-4.
BIG is also the acronym for the Danish architectural firm that designed the system, Bjarke
Ingels Group. NYC: The Big U, REBUILD BY DESIGN, http://www.rebuildbydesign.org/ourwork/all-proposals/winning-projects/big-u (last visited July 31, 2018).
56. Robert Lewis, Why ‘the Big U’ Storm Barrier Could End up as “Half a J,” WNYC
NEWS (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.wnyc.org/story/five-years-later-sandy-project-grinding/.
57. Mandatory Inclusionary Housing, NYC PLAN., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/
planning/plans/mih/mandatory-inclusionary-housing.page (last updated Mar. 22, 2016)
[hereinafter Mandatory Inclusionary Housing].
58. Abigail Savitch-Lew, Retreat or Build Out? NYC’s Post-Sandy Development
Dilemma, CITY LIMITS (Oct. 27, 2017), https://citylimits.org/2017/10/27/retreat-or-build-outnycs-post-sandy-development-dilemma/.
59. East Shore Neighborhoods, NYC PLAN., http://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/plans/
resilient-neighborhoods/east-shore.page (last updated Sept. 7, 2017) [hereinafter East Shore
Neighborhoods].
60. Old Howard Beach, Hamilton Beach and Broad Channel, NYC PLAN.,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/plans/resilient-neighborhoods/old-howard-beachhamilton-beach-broad-channel-rezoning.page (last updated June 21, 2017) [hereinafter Old
Howard Beach].
61. See infra Part V.
62. See, e.g., Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political
Economy of Place, 82:2 Am. J. of Soc. 309, 309–332 (Sept. 1976). As of 2014, the value of
property within the city’s 100-year flood zone was reported to be $129.1 billion. David W.
Chen, As FEMA Revises the Maps to Account for Climate Change, Deciding Who Is in the
Flood Zone Will Be a Battle with Millions of Dollars at Stake, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/07/nyregion/new-york-city-flood-maps-fema.html.
Currently, approximately one in eight new multi-family housing units are being built along
the city’s flood-vulnerable waterfront using resilient construction methods, and they
command accelerating sales prices, despite the known risks of locating in a flood zone.
Stefanos Chen, New Buildings Rise in Flood Zones, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com
/2018/07/06/realestate/luxury/new-buildings-rise-in-floodzones.html.
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rebuilding-as-resilience policy, with only limited consideration of retreat as
part of the resilience calculus.63
C.

Rotterdam: Adapting to the Reality of Living with Water

A busy port situated in a delta of the Rhine and Meuse Rivers at the
mouth of the North Sea, Rotterdam must contend with a geographic fact,
shared by virtually all parts of the Netherlands, that approximately 90% of
the city lies below sea level.64 Reflected in a history of extensive flooding
and loss,65 that fact has led the city to take a holistic approach to resilience
policy making. Climate governance in Rotterdam encompasses a broadgauged adaptation approach to achieve 100% resiliency, the product of the
multisectoral Rotterdam Climate Initiative, a collaboration among Port of
Rotterdam, the City of Rotterdam, port and industries’ association
Deltalinqs, and the DCMR Environmental Protection Agency to reach a
50% decrease in carbon dioxide levels by 2025 and improve economic
outcomes.66 This governance initiative combines coastal protection,
planning public and private space, social education, and even the use of
online apps to promote continuing situational awareness of the sea level.67
As with New Orleans and New York, Rotterdam relies in part on a
massive protective apparatus to hold back a surging sea. The
Maeslantkering floodgate has two vast arms resting on either side of a canal
near the mouth of the North Sea and ball joints that are sunk into the banks
on each side of the river leading to the sea to hold the force of the water as
the gate closes off the sea.68 Thirty pumps remove water from the two arms
63. The City did indicate that it would work with New York State to develop guidelines
under which communities in vulnerable locations might qualify for home buyouts under a
State-administered program, adding that it expected only a “relatively limited number” of
areas to be eligible. A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK, supra note 15, at 81.
64. Dan Grossman, A Tale of Two Northern European Cities: Meeting the Challenges of
Sea Level Rise, PULITZER CTR. (Nov. 6, 2015), https://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/hambergrotterdam-flooding-climate-change-protection.
65. Sarah Goodyear, We’re in This Together: What the Dutch Know About Flooding
That We Don’t, CITYLAB (Jan. 9, 2013), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2013/01/weretogether-what-dutch-know-about-water-we-dont/4355/.
66. BAREND VAN ENGELENBURG & PAUL NOOTHOUT, ROTTERDAM CCS CLUSTER
PROJECT CASE STUDY ON ‘LESSONS LEARNT’, ROTTERDAM CLIMATE INITIATIVE 5–8 (Feb.
2012), http://decarboni.se/sites/default/files/publications/37366/2012rcicasestudyfinalreportopt.pdf.
67. Michael Kimmelman, The Dutch Have Solutions to Rising Seas. The World is
Watching., N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/15/
world/europe/climate-change-rotterdam.html.
68. The Maeslantkering Storm Surge Barrier, HOLLAND, https://www.holland.com
/global/tourism/holland-stories/land-of-water/the-maeslantkering-storm-surge-barrier.htm
(last visited Aug. 13, 2018), discussed in Kimmelman, supra note 67.
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when it is necessary to reopen the gate (if, for example, the rivers leading to
the sea overflow).69
Perhaps the most innovative aspect of Rotterdam’s climate resilience
policy is the program, and philosophy, named “Room for the River.”70
Through this initiative, the city has developed public infrastructure, such as
garages and plazas that also serve as reservoirs for the overflow of the
bodies of water that surround and run through the city. 71 Thus, the city has
built housing around a water plaza, a dike with a rooftop park and shopping
center, known as Dakpark,72 and reclaimed fields and canals that serve as a
sports site, known as Eendragtspolder, while also collecting floodwater.73
With the recognition that the flow of water cannot completely be
stopped, but must rather be accommodated, Rotterdam and other parts of the
Netherlands have developed an adaptive approach that combines armoring
at the mouth of the North Sea with a seemingly inconsistent concept that the
city must be open to flowing water. With this accommodation, and a
nationally promoted readiness to evacuate,74 the city’s approach to resilience
has not closed off any part of the city for development, including
commercial property at the waterfront.75 Rather, it seeks to capitalize on its
vulnerable geography through its formation of a public-private network, the
Rotterdam Centre for Resilient Delta Cities (RDC).76 Thus, resilience in
Rotterdam is building-oriented and accommodative rather than retreatbased.

69. Kimmelman, supra note 67.
70. How Water is Governed: What is Room for the River?, ALTA. WATER PORTAL
SOC’Y., https://albertawater.com/how-is-water-governed/what-is-room-for-the-river (last
visited Aug. 13, 2018), discussed in Kimmelman, supra note 67.
71. Kimmelman, supra note 67.
72. Dakpark Rotterdam, LET IT GROW, https://letitgrow.org/green-initiatives/dakparkrotterdam/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2018), discussed in Kimmelman, supra note 67.
73. Restructuring of the Eendragtspolder, CONNECTED: STRATEGIC CHANGE PROCESSES,
http://www.toconnect.nl/en/a-few-examples/restructuring-of-the-eendragtspolder/ (last visited
Aug. 13, 2018), discussed in Kimmelman, supra note 67.
74. NETH. U.S. WATER CRISIS RES. NETWORK, FLOOD PREPAREDNESS IN THE
NETHERLANDS: A U.S. PERSPECTIVE (2012), https://www.preventionweb.net/files/30381
_nuwcren2012floodpreparednessinthene.pdf (discussing evacuation planning and community
participation in flood response); see also Kimmelman, supra note 67.
75. MARTIN AARTS ET AL., PORT-CITY DEVELOPMENT IN ROTTERDAM: A TRUE LOVE
STORY, DEPARTEMENTO DE UBRANÍSTICA Y ORDENCIÓN DEL TERRITORIO (2012), http://urbane.aq.upm.es/pdf/PortCityDevelopment_ATrueLoveStory.pdf.
76. The apparent goal of the organization is to serve as a resource for delta cities
globally, to marry safety features with improved economic opportunities, and enhance
environmental and social quality. ROTTERDAM CTR. FOR RESILIENT DELTA CITIES,
http://rdcrotterdam. com/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).
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IV. MANAGING RETREAT: UNPACKING RETREAT AS A CLIMATE RESILIENCE
APPROACH
Compared to the coastal and building-structural approaches to
resilience favored by the cities discussed in Part III, a policy grounded in
whole or in part in retreat from the floodplain tends to be more disruptive of
existing features of floodplain communities, and, for that reason, more
challenging to implement.77 It reflects an assessment that measures entailing
“protection in place” are not sufficient to achieve community resilience. The
range of measures comprising retreat offers some flexibility to
municipalities seeking to develop a climate governance policy calibrated to
community characteristics and needs. The suite of retreat mechanisms can
be responsive to the degree of urgency of flooding risk, economic
considerations, the logistical feasibility of pursuing retreat options, the
openness of floodplain communities to retreat measures, and the political
will needed to implement retreat.78
At one end of the spectrum, retreat can entail a complete withdrawal
and resettlement of populations and businesses away from the flood-prone
area. In terms of cost and disruption to the existing community, this option
often generates resistance, and to date has been pursued only when the
safety risks seem imminent and when community members are open to
resettlement.79 Examples include the Catskill Mountains community of
Sidney, New York, Isle de Jean Charles in Louisiana, and the Alaskan
Eskimo village of Newtok. In each of these instances, the circumstances
prompting relocation have been highly urgent. Sidney, New York’s statefunded relocation efforts to move its flood-vulnerable business district and
residences to higher elevations have been discussed by John Nolon in his
analysis of climate change land-use bubbles.80 Isle de Jean Charles is the
recipient of a federally funded “resilience grant” to cover the cost of
resettling willing members of the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw community,
whose coastal home has lost 90% of its original expanse as a result of the
ravages of severe weather and incursions of coastal livelihoods.81 The
77. J. Peter Byrne & Jessica Grannis, Coastal Retreat Measures, in THE LAW OF
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: U.S. AND INT’L. ASPECTS, 268–270 (Michael B. Gerrard
& Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., American Bar Association 2012).
78. Id.
79. John R. Nolon, Land Use and Climate Change Bubbles: Resilience, Retreat, and
Due Diligence, 39 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 321, 337–39 (2014).
80. Id.
81. Coral Davenport & Campbell Robinson, Resettling the First American ‘Climate
Refugees,’ N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/03/us/resettlingthe-first-american-climate-refugees.html. The community joined the Grounded Solutions
Network in 2016, which provides support and capacity building for members to adopt a
community land trust model that removes land from the market and enables long-term
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community of Newtok, is currently embarking on a long-delayed effort to
relocate its village, which is losing land at the rate of seventy feet per year
as a result of erosion and thawing permafrost, to a settlement nine miles
away.82
Where inundation and land loss are less imminent but neighborhoods
that are low-lying or built on wetlands are susceptible to the effects of
recurrent flooding, some residents may seek or accept government
buyouts.83 Examples include programs offered by New York State after
Superstorm Sandy,84 and buyouts offered to flood-prone, largely rural
communities in Iowa and Missouri in the mid-1990s.85 These voluntary
buyouts allow the acquired land to serve as natural buffers to coastal
flooding, and depend in part for their success on the ability to remove
adjacent parcels from development to achieve the hoped-for buffering
effects.86
A third category of retreat responses entails efforts to delay or limit
development in occupied or currently undeveloped at-risk coastal areas,
such as by imposing land-use restrictions on the timing, extent, and density
of building,87 exactions accompanying the grant of permission to develop
that limit or mitigate the impact of development,88 or “rolling” easements or
housing affordability. Adam Abraham, Isle de Jean Charles Band of Biloxi-Chitimacha
Choctaw
Indians,
GROUNDED
SOLUTIONS
NETWORK
https://groundedsolutions.org/member_spotlight
/isle-de-jean-charles-band-biloxichitimacha-choctaw-indians/ (last updated 2006). Decades in the making, the resettlement
process reflects painstaking efforts to adapt to environmental risk and preserve the
community’s tribal traditions and culture. Tribal Resettlement, ISLE DE JEAN CHARLES, LA.,
http://www.isledejeancharles.com/our-resettlement/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).
82. Blake Essig, Newtok Relocation Making Progress, KTUU (Aug. 11, 2017, 12:36
PM), http://www.ktuu.com/content/news/Newtok-relocation-effort-making-progress-43979
7923.html; Robin Bronen, Climate-Induced Community Relocations: Creating an Adaptive
Governance Framework Based in Human Rights Doctrine, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 357, 388-392 (2011) (discussing challenges encountered in Newtok’s efforts to
relocate).
83. See infra notes 84–85 and accompanying text.
84. The Buyout program converts purchased properties to wetlands, open space, or
storm water management systems, allowing the land to serve as nature-based buffers to
flooding; the Acquisition Program contemplates resilient re-development of the properties.
Notice of Change of Use of Acquisition Properties by New York Rising, N.Y. ST.
GOVERNOR’S OFF. OF STORM RECOVERY, https://stormrecovery.ny.gov/housing/buyoutacquisition-programs (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).
85. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 77, at 284–85.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 272–74.
88. Id. at 273–74. To avoid takings liability, mitigating exactions must demonstrate an
“essential nexus” with the underlying land use under application and the “rough
proportionality” of the exaction to the extent of the burden imposed by the development.
SIDERS, supra note 20, at 14–15 (citing Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825
(1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)).
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development restrictions that link limits on development to the landward
movement of the high tide line as a result of sea-level rise.89
Local governments have a range of powers and legal mechanisms at
their disposals with which to pursue a climate policy of managed retreat,
starting with a municipality’s own land-use and eminent domain authority,
in addition to other legal remedies entailed in its police powers to safeguard
public health and safety.90 A local government can pursue a negotiated
buyout of privately held land,91 or, if needed, exercise its eminent domain
power by demonstrating that removing property from developable use
serves a public safety and health purpose. Localities can arrange a transfer
of development rights further inland,92 or acquire a conservation easement,93
or a rolling easement that permits upland development but limits later use of
the property as sea-level rise affects the shoreline.94
Local governments can also use public nuisance doctrine to challenge
or curtail risk-creating uses.95 In the context of sea-level rise, they can
ground regulation restricting uses of property on the need to prevent
interference with land covered by the public trust doctrine, typically land
beneath navigable waters and tidelands.96 Additionally, local governments
can impose building restrictions to bar redevelopment in flood-prone areas,
or place coastal property in a land trust to insulate it from development.97 To
89. SIDERS, supra note 20, at 54–57; J. Peter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea-level
Rise, Property Rights, and Time, 73 LA. L. REV. 69, 109–12 (2012) [hereinafter The
Cathedral Engulfed].
90. Robin Kundis Craig, Of Sea Level Rise and Superstorms: The Public Health Police
Power as a Means of Defending Against “Takings” Challenges to Coastal Regulation, 22
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 84, 114 (2014) (arguing that in the context of takings challenges, courts
are likely to be more receptive to measures addressing threat of coastal inundation that are
framed as exercise of the public health police power rather than land-use regulation takings
challenges).
91. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 77, at 283–85.
92. SIDERS, supra note 20, at 107–08; Byrne & Grannis, supra note 77, at 287–89.
93. SIDERS, supra note 20, at 104–08.
94. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 77, at 285–86; SIDERS, supra note 20, at 54–61.
95. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 77, at 276.
96. The Cathedral Engulfed, supra note 89, at 99–100. The public trust follows the
landward progression of the tide line such that privately-owned land will be subordinate to
the public trust. Under these circumstances, regulation of public trust lands will not result in a
“taking” requiring compensation. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 77, at 276.
97. See, e.g., SIDERS, supra note 20, at 85-102 (discussing rebuilding restrictions);
Climate Change: Land and Climate Program, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE https://www.landtrust
alliance.org/topics/climate-change (last visited Oct. 28, 2018) (outlining developing strategies
for using land trusts to conserve land from development that would otherwise exacerbate
harmful effects associated with climate change), cited in Jessica Owley et al., Climate
Change Challenges for Land Conservation: Rethinking Conservation Easements, Strategies,
and Tools, 95 DEN. U. L. REV. 727, 732 n.18 (2018).
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the extent that any of these mechanisms entails physical entry upon or
limiting the economic value of privately owned land that is not itself
creating a nuisance or violating public safety or health standards, local
governments presumably would be required to compensate property owners
under the regulatory takings doctrine.98
A.

A Calculus of Vulnerability: Who Lives in the Floodplain?

Congress created the National Flood Insurance Program in 1968;
participating jurisdictions adopt a floodplain management ordinance setting
design and construction standards.99 FEMA flood insurance rate maps divide
the U.S. into 100-year-flood (1% probability of flooding in any given year)
and 500-year-flood zones (.02% annual probability).100 Given the
projections of increased sea-level rise and climate change-related severe
weather, the extent of residential occupancy in floodplains is a revealing
indicator of climate vulnerability.
A study of the housing stock in the 100-year floodplain and the
combined 100-year and 500-year floodplains in the U.S. in 2011–2015
indicates that more than 30 million people lived in the combined
floodplain.101 The study also pinpoints the coastal areas that are heavily
occupied. During this period, Florida had the highest number of occupied
housing units in the 100-year and combined 100-year and 500-year
floodplains.102 Texas, California, New York, and Louisiana round out the
top five states for occupied housing in the 100-year and combined
floodplains.103 “Two-thirds of the population living in the nation’s combined
floodplains lived either in California, Florida, Arizona, Texas, or New York
in 2011-2015.”104
The housing units located in the floodplains bear a number of earmarks
of vulnerability relating both to the attributes of the housing and its
occupants. Out of all housing units in the 100-year and combined 100-year
and 500-year floodplains, 22% were built before 1960 and thus are less

98. See, e.g., Byrne & Grannis, supra note 77, at 274–78; SIDERS, supra note 20, at 13–
20; Craig, supra note 90, at 89–99.
99. STEPHANIE ROSOFF & JESSICA YAGER, HOUSING IN THE U.S. FLOODPLAINS, NYU
FURMAN CTR. 4 (May 2017), http://furmancenter.org/files/NYUFurmanCenter_HousingIn
TheFloodplain_May2017.pdf.
100. Id. at 2.
101. CAROLINE PERI, STEPHANIE ROSOFF & JESSICA YAGER, POPULATION IN THE U.S.
FLOODPLAINS, NYU FURMAN CTR. 2 (DEC. 2017), http://furmancenter.org/files/Floodplain
_PopulationBrief_12DEC2017.pdf.
102. ROSOFF & YAGER, supra note 99, at 6.
103. Id. at 6–7.
104. PERI ET AL., supra note 101, at 2.
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likely to be built to FEMA standards.105 The study also indicated the extent
to which coastal areas housed lower-income individuals living in public
housing (5% of all public housing units are located in the 100-year
floodplain and 9% in the combined floodplains),106 and in privately-owned
subsidized housing units (4% are located in the 100-year floodplain and 8%
are in the combined floodplain area).107 As a further indicator of the
economic wherewithal of floodplain residents, the data showed, among the
census tracts located in the 100-year floodplain, that a higher proportion of
the population lived in moderate-poverty U.S. Census Bureau tracts108
compared to non-floodplain areas, and in the combined floodplain area, a
higher proportion of the population lived in high-poverty109 Census Bureau
tracts than in non-floodplain tracts.110 In terms of ethnicity, which often
serves as a proxy for vulnerability, the study highlighted that a higher
proportion of the population living in the combined floodplains identified as
Hispanic/Latino (25%) compared to the proportion of Latinos in the U.S.
population (17%);111 a lower proportion of the population living in the
combined floodplain identified as white (55%) compared to the proportion
of persons so identifying in the U.S. population as a whole (62%).112
That 10% of the U.S population is exposed to the risk of living in the
combined floodplain is a significant geographic index of vulnerability.
Given the projections for continued sea-level rise, the additional indicators
of vulnerability noted here, relating to populations and housing associated
with poverty, and older housing that is less likely to meet federal flood105. ROSOFF & YAGER, supra note 99, at 4–5.
106. Id. at 5.
107. Id.
108. The U.S. Census Bureau defines moderate-poverty tracts as comprising tracts where
between 10–30% of the residents live in poverty. PERI ET AL., supra note 101, at 4.
109. The U.S. Census Bureau defines high-poverty tracts as those tracts in which the
proportion of the population in poverty exceeds 30%. Id. The Census Bureau designates
households as in poverty according to the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB’s)
Directive 14, using a set of money income thresholds that vary by family size and make-up.
“If the total income for a family or unrelated individual falls below the relevant poverty
threshold, then the family (and every individual in it) or unrelated individual is designated to
be in poverty.” The Census Bureau also uses a Supplemental Poverty Measure, which
extends the official poverty measure by considering government benefits and expenses such
as taxes that are not included in the official measure. Glossary, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/glossary/#term_Poverty (last visited Aug. 1, 2018).
110. PERI ET AL., supra note 101, at 4–5.
111. Id. at 3.
112. Id. The numbers were revealing for Arkansas, where, during the study period, 27%
of residents in the combined floodplain were identified as “Black, Non-Hispanic,” whereas
15% of the statewide population fell into that category. Id. at 9. With respect to poverty,
Arkansas was among a number of states in which the poverty rate in the combined floodplain
was at least three percentage points higher than the statewide poverty rate during the study
period. Id. at 4.
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proofing requirements, underscore the relevance of including these data in
the calculus for considering retreat options among other climate governance
approaches.
B.

A Calculus of Costs: Economic Implications of Retreat

If the risks of continued coastal settlement are significant, the public
costs of undertaking coastal retreat to augment a community’s resilience to
risk can at first blush seem staggering. Where relocation of an existing
community is under consideration, these costs include acquiring property,
relocation costs, and the prospect of lost tax revenues if the relocating
residents and businesses do not settle in the same taxing jurisdiction.113 The
risk that discontinuing coastal development would depress surrounding
property values could further reduce tax revenues.114 Infrastructure
adjustments needed as a result of resettlement must be added in the calculus
as well.115
However, a policy of retreat that limits development in favor of naturebased reuses of land also averts costs. Choosing not to develop or redevelop
coastal land can be restorative of coastal ecosystems, which, if allowed to
thrive, provide a range of benefits, including flood protection in upland
areas and preventing or slowing coastal erosion by absorbing wave energy
resulting from ocean movements.116 A recent study examining data from
sixty-nine field measurements of coastal habitats for impact on reducing
wave height furnished evidence of the wave-reduction effects of coastal
habitats.117 These protective wave-reduction effects were also found to
reduce the economic losses otherwise caused by flooding.118 A number of
113. ROBERT FREUDENBERG, ELLIS CALVIN, LAURA TOLKOFF & DARE BRAWLEY, BUY-IN
FOR BUYOUTS: THE CASE FOR MANAGED RETREAT FROM FLOOD ZONES, LINCOLN INST. OF
LAND POL’Y 38–39 (2016), https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/buy-in-forbuyouts-full.pdf.
114. Id. at 16.
115. See, e.g., DEPT’ OF CITY PLAN., VISION 2020: NEW YORK CITY COMPREHENSIVE
WATERFRONT PLAN 106–13 (2011), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf
/plans-studies/vision-2020-cwp/vision2020/chapter3_goal8.pdf [hereinafter NEW YORK CITY
COMPREHENSIVE WATERFRONT PLAN]
116. Coastal Wetlands, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/wetlands
/coastal-wetlands (last updated June 13, 2018).
117. Siddharth Narayan et al., The Effectiveness, Costs and Coastal Protection Benefits of
Natural and Nature-Based Defences, PLOS ONE (May 2, 2016), https://doi.org/10.1371
/journal.pone.0154735. Among other findings, the study concluded that “coastal habitats–
particularly coral reefs and salt-marshes–have significant potential for reducing wave heights
and providing protection at the shoreline.” Id. at 9.
118. See, e.g., Robert Costanza et al., The Value of Coastal Wetlands for Hurricane
Protection, 37 AMBIO 241 (June 2008), http://www.robertcostanza.com/wp-content/uploads/
2017/02/2008_J_Costanza_HurricaneProtection.pdf.
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studies suggest that the natural protections afforded by coastal wetlands can
be more cost-effective than built protective structures. To this point,
wetlands have been likened to ‘‘horizontal levees.”119
Recognizing that the incidence of wetlands is one of a number of
factors that can affect the risk of flooding, one recent study of marsh
wetlands in the northeastern United States estimated that wetlands reduced
flood damage across twelve states from Hurricane Sandy, which struck in
late October 2012, by slightly more than 1%, and avoided $625 million in
direct flood damages from the hurricane.120 Another branch of the study,
focused on a single county in New Jersey, predicted a 16% average
reduction in yearly flood losses.121 The study noted that states having more
extensive wetland cover were “strongly correlated with avoided damages”;
among the four Sandy states in the study with the most extensive wetlands
cover, wetlands were estimated to reduce flood damages by 20% to 30%.122
This evidence of the cost benefits of ecosystem services suggests a
greater role for nature-based coastal defenses vis-à-vis hard armoring as
well as greater consideration of the value of buying out high-risk coastal
areas and pursuing nature-based reuses in place of redevelopment. Another
economic benefit of buyouts linked to nature-based defenses of flood-prone
land is that they avoid the use of payouts of subsidized wind and flood
insurance to rebuild repetitively damaged coastal properties. As publichealth and environmental law scholar Ed Richards has argued, given the
evidence that both state-regulated private insurance practices and public
programs such as the National Flood Insurance Program set property
insurance in vulnerable areas below its actual cost, insurance rates do not
accurately communicate risk or provide incentives to adapt to the increasing
risks of sea-level rise.123 Disaster relief programs further enable, if not

119. Id. at 241. See also Narayan et al., supra note 117 (concluding that “restoration
projects for which data are available—i.e., mangrove and marsh projects—can be costeffective relative to submerged breakwaters in attenuating low waves and become more costeffective at higher water depths”).
120. Siddharth Narayan et al., The Value of Coastal Wetlands for Flood Damage
Reduction in the Northeastern USA, 7 Sci. Rep. 1, 2 (Aug. 31, 2017).
121. Id. at 5. The study concluded that sites with salt marshes had “significantly lower
annual flood losses” than locations without marshes. Id. at 4–5.
122. Id. at 2.
123. Edward P. Richards, Applying Life Insurance Principles to Coastal Property
Insurance to Incentivize Adaptation to Climate Change, 43 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 427,
450–51, 459 (2016), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol43/iss2/8 (proposing a life
insurance model for insuring properties facing an increasing risk of loss to sea-level rise,
arguing that true risk-based insurance with a rising premium would more accurately
communicate the climate change risk for the property, reduce the value of the property as a
result of the increasing cost of the insurance, and ultimately encourage retreat-based
adaptation).

2018]

ADAPTING LAND USE TO CLIMATE CHANGE

625

encourage, property owners to rebuild in high-risk areas.124 These costly
practices must be accounted for in any cost-benefit calculus considering the
economic feasibility of retreat.
C.

Complicating the Calculus: Beyond Economics

Beyond the economic implications of embracing retreat policies, the
confluence of logistical considerations, geography, and the psychology of
place also influences the extent to which climate governance will take
retreat options into account. Where retreat would require withdrawal and
relocation of current settlements, whether relocation within reasonable
proximity of the coastal settlement is feasible depends in part on the
geography and topography of the surrounding area. The impact of relocation
on existing public infrastructure and patterns of residential and business
settlement, particularly in densely populated areas,125 must be considered.
Further, residents’ attachment to place,126 and the documented psychological
effects of mandated relocations,127 may fuel strong community reactions
against managed retreat as a policy. The fragmentation of existing
community affiliations can be destabilizing, and the effects of relocation can
be particularly disruptive of the cultural traditions and cohesiveness of longestablished settlements, such as the indigenous communities relocating from
Isle de Jean Charles in Louisiana128 and Newtok, Alaska.129
The nature and extent of building typology and the housing availability
in coastal areas also complicate the feasibility of community-based retreat.
For example, the prevalence of one-story frame bungalows along the coastal
landscape, conspicuous in parts of New York City, is tied to the
affordability of this housing form.130 Where housing markets are
competitive, favoring sellers, the absence of comparably affordable housing
farther inland can become a barrier to relocation.131 Where, also in New
124. Id. at 448–49.
125. NEW YORK CITY COMPREHENSIVE WATERFRONT PLAN, supra note 115, at 106.
126. SHERI BROKOPP BINDER, RESILIENCE AND POSTDISASTER RELOCATION: A STUDY OF
NEW YORK’S HOME BUYOUT PLAN IN THE WAKE OF HURRICANE SANDY (Aug. 2013), https://
hazards.colorado.edu/uploads/quick_report/binder_2013.pdf.
127. MINDY THOMPSON FULLILOVE, ROOT SHOCK: HOW TEARING UP CITY
NEIGHBORHOODS HURTS AMERICA AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 9–20, 52–70, 165–96
(2005) (2004).
128. See Davenport & Robinson, supra note 81.
129. See Essig, supra note 82.
130. See generally A.F. Brady, Building Back the Bungalow, URBAN OMNIBUS (July 13,
2016), http://urbanomnibus.net/2016/07/build-back-bungalow.
131. Id.; Elizabeth Rush, Leaving the Sea: Staten Islanders Experiment with Managed
Retreat, URBAN OMNIBUS (Feb. 11, 2015), http://urbanomnibus.net/2015/02/leaving-the-seastaten-islanders-experiment-with-managed-retreat/.
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York City, high-rise public housing developments seem to stand sentinel
along highly vulnerable coastal areas,132 a policy of resettlement would need
to address the costs and logistical challenges of relocating thousands of lowincome residents of multi-family housing, often with special needs, where
comparable affordable housing is at a premium.133
Undoubtedly, retreat-as-relocation can present particularly daunting
challenges to discrete communities, encompassing environmental harm,
potential loss of community cohesiveness and cultural identity, as well as
economic factors tied to loss of coastal livelihood or access to more
affordable housing. When the complicating factor of scale manifests in
large-city scenarios, the barriers can seem insurmountable. Despite these
challenges, the projections for continued sea-level rise and the associated
risk of damage from storm surges make even retreat-as-relocation an
increasingly salient consideration for coastal cities. Moreover, a more
tailored application of retreat-as-relocation may be feasible, even in the
context of large urban areas, that achieves public health and safety goals and
ecological benefits, while also reaching a sounder macro-economic
outcome, closing the spigot of public expenditure for repetitive loss
properties. The discussion in Part V turns to recent indications that New
York City may be open to pursuing a tailored approach to retreat within a
larger framework of continued development.134
V. RETREAT REVISITED: NEW YORK’S LIMITED RESORT TO RETREAT
It is estimated that New York City has a larger number of people
inhabiting flood-vulnerable areas than any other U.S. city.135 Following
Superstorm Sandy’s devastating impact, New York City has emphasized
repairing, rebuilding, retrofitting, and elevating coastal structures as part of
132. Hurricane Sandy After Action, CITY OF N.Y. (May 2013), http://www.nyc.gov/html
/recovery/downloads/pdf/sandy_aar_5.2.13.pdf (referring throughout to the impact on public
housing residents and structures).
133. Any such policy of retreat from the coastline would reverse the policy of an earlier
era, when New York City’s low-income families displaced as a result of “slum
clearance”were assigned to the city’s periphery, far from transportation arteries and
employment opportunities, out of considerations of cost, to make way for urban renewal
developments closer to the city’s Manhattan core. Jonathan Mahler, How the Coastline
Became a Place to Put the Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/nyregion /how-new-york-citys-coastline-became-hometo-the-poor.html. See also NICHOLAS DAGEN BLOOM, PUBLIC HOUSING THAT WORKED: NEW
YORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 59, 62, 7072, 13031, 141 (2008).
134. See infra Part V.
135. Rush, supra note 131. That number might increase when FEMA completes its
negotiated revision of New York City’s flood zone maps in light of recognized climate
change risks such as sea-level rise. Id.
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an overall rebuilding approach to resilience governance.136 Although
NewYork has not embraced retreat as a land-use strategy, the city has
launched a Resilient Neighborhoods137 Initiative that in selected areas
incorporates limited aspects of retreat in combination with other resilience
approaches. This willingness to link the idea of resilience with modest
retreat measures along parts of the coastline considered to be particularly at
risk reflects some effort by the city, if belated, to calibrate its resilience
policy-setting with closer consideration of local geography and
neighborhood contexts along the city’s 520 miles of waterfront. The
following discussion addresses these recent developments and their
implications for climate governance for large, heavily developed and
populated urban areas.138
A.

Aligning State-Government Buyouts with Local Zoning Measures

In Sandy’s aftermath, a discrete number of New York City residents in
three high-risk neighborhoods along the eastern shore of Staten Island
availed themselves of the New York Rising Buyout Program.139 The
program is a fairly circumscribed aspect of what is essentially a rebuilding
and recovery initiative administered by the New York State Governor’s
Office of Storm Recovery and funded by a federal Community
Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery grant.140 Under the program,
the State of New York has purchased properties mainly in the city’s borough
of Staten Island and in the suburban Long Island region east of New York
City at pre-storm values, with a commitment not to redevelop the purchased
land but to allow it to serve, as in its predeveloped state, as a natural buffer
against flooding.141 The New York Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery
has reported that, as of October 2016, the State of New York had purchased

136. See supra notes 4363 and accompanying text.
137. Resilient Neighborhoods, NYC PLAN., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/plans/
resilient-neighborhoods.page (last updated Sept. 7, 2017) [hereinafter Resilient
Neighborhoods].
138. See infra Part V.A.
139. N.Y. ST. GOVERNOR’S OFF. OF STORM RECOVERY, supra note 84.
140. N.Y. ST. GOVERNOR’S OFF. OF STORM RECOVERY, NY RISING 4TH ANNIVERSARY
REPORT 2012–2016, 4, 12 (2016), https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files
/atoms/files/10292016_GOSR4thAnniversary.pdf. The program is described as pursuing two
principal goals: “The first: to address damage, quickly dispense aid to homeowners and small
businesses, and satisfy immediate rebuilding needs. The second: to build back better while
instituting smart long-term resiliency measures to maximize and further fortify such precious
and critical gains.” Id. at 4.
141. Id. at 12.
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more than 600 properties statewide, at a cost of $240 million, through the
program.142
The three Staten Island communities that participated in these
voluntary buyouts—Oakwood Beach, Ocean Breeze, and Graham Beach—
were located in the East Shore, a four-mile, low-elevation area heavily
damaged by Superstorm Sandy.143 These Staten Island residents were
proactive in forming a buyout committee, gauging the interest of other
residents, and identifying vulnerable properties to be included in a buyout
plan.144 Although the buyout with natural re-use of land was not a city
initiative, the New York City Council has since amended its Zoning Code to
limit the density of future development in the buyout areas.145
As part of the city’s Resilient Neighborhoods initiative, the East Shore
is one of ten neighborhoods located in the floodplain that the city has
earmarked for a more tailored land-use approach to resilience planning.146 In
the East Shore Special Risk District and Rezoning, the Council enacted
provisions proposed by the city’s Department of Planning that aligned with
the State’s determination that these East Shore communities qualified for
buyouts.147 The zoning measure’s key provisions recognized the East
Shore’s vulnerability to flood damage, in part because of its location and its
“aging” housing stock, as well as the buffering value of its “hundreds of
acres of wetlands, Bluebelts, and parks.”148
The main restrictions on development, limiting building in the district
to single-family detached residences, were intended to ensure consistency
with the area’s open space and infrastructure plans and limit encroachments
on wetlands.149 This attention to protecting wetlands and open space while
lowering the density of future East Shore development is a significant, if
limited, departure from the city’s A Stronger, More Resilient New York; it
incorporates components of retreat in a program that nonetheless remains
committed to safe and contextual development in the East Shore area.150

142. Id.
143. Rush, supra note 131.
144. Id.
145. East Shore Neighborhoods, supra note 59.
146. Resilient Neighborhoods, supra note 137.
147. East Shore Neighborhoods, supra note 59.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. The East Shore rezoning contemplates “changes to residential zoning to help ensure
that future development is resilient to coastal flooding, safe and accessible for residents, and
in line with the character of the surrounding neighborhood, while promoting mixed-use
residential and commercial development in areas where growth may be desirable.” Id.
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Planning and Zoning in the Jamaica Bay Watershed

A recently announced community planning initiative, Resilient
Edgemere in the city’s borough of Queens, reflects a more locally specific
approach to resilience planning in place of a blanket embrace of rebuilding
that characterized New York City’s first responses to Sandy.151 Edgemere is
part of the Jamaica Bay Watershed, a highly urbanized estuary and wildlife
refuge located at the site of an international airport, exposed to high levels
of greenhouse gas emissions, and vulnerable by its location to Atlantic
storms and coastal flooding.152 In developing Edgemere’s resilience
initiative, which followed seventeen months of community engagement, the
city committed to a suite of land-use investments: increasing flood
protection; constructing resilient housing farther inland, away from low
lying coastal neighborhoods, including some proposed resettlement of
residents to these areas; maintaining open space; and creating street and
infrastructure improvements.153
The city’s relatively modest, neighborhood-based relocations away
from the coastal area entail moving “eligible and willing” residents onto
city-owned land and limiting housing development in a to-be-created
Hazard Mitigation Zone by placing deed restrictions on lots that the city
would acquire.154 The Plan prompted concern and resistance from some
community members,155 which suggests the strong attachment to place that
complicates use of managed retreat with resettlement, even when access to
retreat is offered on a voluntary basis. Perhaps anticipating these responses,
the city seems scrupulously to have avoided the rhetoric of retreat in the
Edgemere proposal; instead, it uses “de-densifying” to capture the idea of
resettling residents further inland to avoid flooding.156
The lead agency for the Edgemere Community Plan is the city’s
Department of Housing Preservation and Development, highlighting the
extent to which a central plan to provide, but control, housing options has
shaped this community-based initiative. In tandem with this broader-based
151. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV., RESILIENT EDGEMERE COMMUNITY P LAN 16
(2017),
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdf/community/resilient-edgemerereport.pdf.
152. William D. Solecki et al., Why Prospects for Resilience for Jamaica Bay?, in
PROSPECTS FOR RESILIENCE: INSIGHTS FROM NEW YORK CITY’S JAMAICA BAY, 3, 8–12 (2016).
153. NYC Department of Housing Preservation and Development Releases the Resilient
Edgemere Community Plan, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV. (May 20, 2017), http://
www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/about/press-releases/2017/03/03-20-17.page.
154. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF PRES. & DEV., supra note 151, at 24.
155. See, e.g., Nathan Kensinger, A Long-Neglected Queens Neighborhood Grapples with
the Effects of Climate Change in NYC, CURBED N.Y. (Apr. 13, 2017, 1:15 PM),
https://ny.curbed.com/2017/4/13/15280808/climate-change-queens-edgemere-photo-essay.
156. Id.
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community planning in Edgemere, the city has exercised its zoning authority
in nearby Jamaica Bay communities, adopting a Special Coastal Risk
District and Rezoning for Hamilton Beach and Broad Channel.157 Noting the
area’s “exceptional flood risk,” the rezonings limit development to detached
houses and one-family (Broad Channel) or two-family (Hamilton Beach)
residences.158
The zoning amendment creating the Special Coastal Risk District ties
the enactment to the City’s public health, safety, and welfare powers; at the
same time, it includes the goal of maintaining the city’s tax base by
“promot[ing] the most desirable use of land and . . . the value of land and
buildings.”159 Thus, the city has developed a flexible mechanism to
decelerate development in at-risk coastal areas without effecting a complete
withdrawal from these regulated areas; the city has integrated land-use
controls within a framework that contemplates continued productive uses of
the rezoned areas, when feasible.
These resilience planning and zoning regulations are modest and do not
alter the city’s overall orientation in climate governance to rebuilding. This
is especially evident in the city’s commitment to up-zone neighborhoods,
including neighborhoods located in the city’s floodplain, as a key strategy
for spurring both market-based development and creation of below-marketrate housing units.160 However, the more targeted responses to areas that
157. Mandatory Inclusionary Housing, supra note 57.
158. Id.
159. The Zoning Amendment stated the following “general goals” and “specific
purposes”:

(a) to limit the population in areas that are vulnerable to frequent
flooding, including those areas exceptionally at risk from projected
future tidal flooding;
(b)to reduce the potential for property damage and disruption from
regular flood events and support the City’s capacity to provide
infrastructure and services;
(c) to promote consistency with planned improvements, neighborhood
plans, and other measures to promote drainage, coastal protection, open
space and other public purposes;
(d) provide sound planning in areas that have historically been occupied
by wetlands and, where plans exist, for such areas to be maintained as
open space; and
(e) to promote the most desirable use of land and thus conserve the value
of land and buildings, and thereby protect the City’s tax revenue.
DEP’T OF CITY PLAN., ARTICLE XIII: SPECIAL PURPOSE DISTRICTS, CHAPTER 7: SPECIAL
COASTAL RISK DISTRICT, IN ZONING RESOLUTION: THE CITY OF NEW YORK § 137–200 (Sept.
7, 2017), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/zoning/zoning-text/art13c
07.pdf.
160. See Mandatory Inclusionary Housing, supra note 57.
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present a heightened risk of flooding stand in contrast to the city’s earlier
blanket rejection of retreat in A Stronger, More Resilient New York. These
recent responses suggest that the city is shifting—if slowly and only
slightly—to a more nuanced spatial assessment of vulnerability.
VI. CONCLUSION: AN INVENTORY FOR CONSIDERING RETREAT
Coastal cities must navigate, literally and metaphorically, the uncharted
waters produced by sea-level rise and storm surges. Developing effective
governance responses benefits from understanding coastal areas as “socioecological systems,”161 or multilayered systems that form “literal edges of
ecological and cultural zones.”162 Crafting climate governance entails
processes that take appropriate account of the interplay between the physical
and social dimensions of coastal communities, and that recognize, in turn,
the importance of community-based learning and social integration.163
Informed by a socio-ecological systems approach, a coastal community’s
vulnerability to climate risk builds from a complex, multi-faceted set of
conditions, including “characteristics of exposure, susceptibility, and coping
capacity, shaped by dynamic historical processes, differential entitlements,
political economy, and power relations, rather than as a direct outcome of a
perturbation or stress.”164 A sound approach to resilience governance is thus
a broad-gauged inquiry, one that is equally attentive to equity and
environmental concerns.
Using a socio-ecological systems lens, an inquiry into whether and how
retreat can be integrated into a locality’s climate governance scheme calls
for a careful assessment of a range of factors: ecological, public health, and
safety considerations; implications of retreat for infrastructure and the built
environment; the source and extent of federal, state, and local legal authority
to pursue retreat; political capacity/will to engage retreat; the extent of
expenditure of public money for retreat (acquisition and relocation costs,
foregone tax revenues) vis-à-vis rebuilding (cost of reconstruction that
meets enhanced code and insurance requirements, regulatory oversight);
identifying sources of public and private money available to underwrite
resettlement; effective stewardship of the social infrastructure (drawing here
161. A socio-ecological system may be defined as a “multlilevel or nested system that
exhibits interactions to physical, ecological systems and human or social systems.” Shorna
Allred et al., Social-Ecological System Transformation in Jamaica Bay, in PROSPECTS FOR
RESILIENCE: INSIGHTS FROM NEW YORK CITY’S JAMAICA BAY 43 (Sanderson et al., eds. 2016).
162. Id. at 44.
163. Id. at 44–45.
164. Fiona Miller et al., Resilience and Vulnerability: Complementary or Conflicting
Concepts?, 15:3 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 11 (2010), http://www.ecologyandsociet y.org/vol15/iss3
/art11/.
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on sociologist Eric Klinenberg’s use of the term);165 relatedly, community
education and engagement concerning the variables that make the need for
relocation more urgent; sociological and psychological dimensions of
policies that encourage or require retreat; and short-term versus long-term
approaches to retreat.166
Although none of these factors, on their own, would likely be sufficient
to support a determination to initiate retreat measures, these interrelated
considerations engage a broad, landscape-mapping perspective that includes
sociological and psychological aspects of community resilience crucial to
climate governance. As localities confront the increasing urgency of rising
sea levels and the consequences of coastal flooding, they must develop a
contextualized understanding of the range of strategies encapsulated in
managed retreat. Coastal communities must commit to a governance process
that more centrally incorporates, rather than subordinates, consideration of
retreat mechanisms in climate resilience planning, such that managing
retreat becomes as integral to climate governance as resilient rebuilding and
hard armoring the coastline.

165. Eric Klinenberg, Adaptation: How Can Cities be “Climate-Proofed?”, NEW
YORKER (Jan. 7, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/01/07/adaptation-2
(defining “social infrastructure” as “the people, places, and institutions that foster cohesion
and support”).
166. This inventory draws, in part, on the work of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, which has developed an equity-based climate change
adaptation planning approach. NAACP Equity in Building Resilience in Adaptation Planning,
ADAPTATION CLEARINGHOUSE (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.adaptationclearinghouse.org/
resources/naacp-equity-in-building-resilience-in-adaptation-planning.html,
discussed
in
Andrea McArdle, Climate Risk and Resilience Planning in an Urban Governance Context, 3
IGLUS QUARTERLY 2, 4–6 (Sept. 2017), http://fsr.eui.eu/iglus-quarterly-vol-3-no-2-localgovernance/.

